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What	 we	 perceive	 and	 believe	 on	 any	 given	 moment	 will	 allow	 us	 to	 form	
expectations	about	what	we	will	experience	 in	the	next.	 In	psychosis,	 it	 is	believed	
that	the	influence	of	these	so-called	perceptual	and	cognitive	‘prior’	expectations	on	




for	 psychosis	 and	 individuals	 with	 a	 first	 episode	 of	 psychosis,	 thereby	 partially	
explaining	the	mixed	findings	in	the	literature.	We	indeed	found	evidence	in	favour	







Alterations	 in	 the	 balance	 between	 prior	 expectations	 and	 sensory	 evidence	 may	













and	 established	 phases	 of	 psychosis,	 and	 how	 this	 relates	 to	 cingulate	 glutamate	
levels	 assessed	 by	 magnetic	 resonance	 spectroscopy.	 The	 psychosis	 group	 relied	
more	on	high	level	cognitive	priors	compared	to	both	healthy	controls	and	those	at	
clinical	 risk	 for	psychosis,	and	more	on	 low	 level	perceptual	priors	 than	the	clinical	
risk	group.	The	risk	group	were	marginally	less	reliant	on	low	level	perceptual	priors	
than	controls.	The	results	are	consistent	with	previous	theory	that	influences	of	prior	







error,	 a	 hierarchical	 computational	 framework	 usually	 referred	 to	 as	 predictive	
coding	 (Rao	&	 Ballard	 et	 al.,	 1999;	 Bar,	 2009;	 Friston,	 2005	&	 2009;	 Bastos	 et	 al.,	
2012;	 Clark	 et	 al.,	 2013	 &	 2015;	 Hohwy	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Knill	 et	 al.,	 2004).	 In	 this	
framework,	 the	 formation	 of	 delusional	 beliefs	 and	 hallucinatory	 experiences	 are	
proposed	 to	 be	 due	 to	 alterations	 in	 the	 cognitive	 and	 biological	 mechanisms	 of	
predictive	coding	(Fletcher	&	Frith,	2009;	Adams	et	al.,	2013).		
	
Whilst	 initial	 clinical	 studies	 documenting	 alterations	 in	 the	 way	 the	 expectation	
influences	 perception	 in	 psychosis	 are	 promising	 in	 demonstrating	 case-control	
alterations	 in	 various	 behavioural	 measures	 of	 predictive	 coding	 (eg	 Shergill	 et	 al	
2005,	Teufel	et	al.,	2010;	Powers	et	al	2017),	it	is	already	clear	that	there	will	be	no	
straightforward	 unifying	 explanation	 of	 psychosis	 in	 simple	 terms	 of	 priors	 being	
“too	 strong”	 or	 “too	 weak”	 in	 general.	 Predictive	 processing	 theory	 envisions	 a	
highly	interlinked	(cortical)	cognitive	hierarchy,	where	different	layers	aim	to	predict	
the	 incoming	 input	 from	 lower-layers	 (Rao	&	Ballard	 et	 al.,	 1999;	Bar	 et	 al.,	 2009;	
Friston,	2005	&	2009;	Bastos	et	 al.,	 2012;	Clark	et	 al.,	 2013	&	2015;	Hohwy	et	 al.,	
2013;	 Knill	 et	 al.,	 2004).	 Moving	 up	 the	 hierarchy,	 the	 predictions	 become	 more	
abstract,	 ranging	 from	 lower-level	 sensory	prediction	 to	higher-order	beliefs	about	
the	 environment.	 It	 therefore	 does	 not	 suffice	 to	 ask	 the	 question	 whether	 prior	
expectations	 are	 stronger	 or	 weaker	 in	 psychosis.	 Instead	 in	 order	 to	 form	 a	
complete	picture	of	the	underlying	mechanisms	of	psychosis,	we	need	to	look	at	the	
contribution	 of	 different	 types	 of	 prior	 expectations,	 including	 both	 sensory	
expectations	and	higher-level	beliefs	about	the	environment.		
	
Recent	 influential	 predictive	 coding	 accounts	 of	 psychosis	 have	 emphasized	 that	
priors	at	 low	and	high	hierarchical	 levels	may	be	differentially	affected	in	psychotic	
illness.	For	example,	Sterzer	et	al	(2018)	conclude	that	“In	contrast	to	weak	low-level	
priors,	 the	effects	of	more	abstract	high-level	priors	may	be	abnormally	 strong”	 in	
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psychosis.	 This	 postulate	 is	 mainly	 drawn	 through	 a	 combination	 of	 theoretical	
arguments	 and	 synthesis	 across	diverse	 studies.	 To	our	 knowledge	no	 single	 study	
has	yet	demonstrated	a	combination	of	weak	low-level	perceptual	priors	and	strong	
high-level	cognitive	priors	 in	patients	with	psychosis,	although	Schmack	(2013)	and	
colleagues	 provided	 supportive	 evidence	 in	 a	 study	 of	 individual	 differences	 in	
healthy	individuals.	Those	authors	delineated	priors	at	different	hierarchical	levels	by	
manipulating	what	they	referred	to	as	perceptual	priors	and	cognitive	priors	in	two	
related	 experiments;	 they	 found	 that	 delusional	 ideation	 in	 health	 (sometimes	
termed	delusion	proneness)	was	associated	with	a	decrease	 in	 the	 contribution	of	
perceptual	priors,	and	an	increase	in	the	contribution	of	cognitive	priors,	highlighting	
the	 importance	 to	separate	 the	 two	 (Schmack	et	al.,	2013).	Clearly,	 clinical	 studies	
are	required	testing	the	hypothesis	of	simultaneous	weak	low-level	and	strong	high-





markedly	 different	 at	 different	 illness	 stages,	 adding	 nuance	 to	 the	 attractive,	 yet	
arguably	 overly	 simplistic,	 continuum	 model	 of	 psychosis.	 Previous	 reviews	
acknowledge	that	 there	may	be	evolving	patterns	of	cognitive	and/or	physiological	
disturbances	over	time	as	psychotic	illness	develops	(Fletcher	&	Frith,	2009;	Adams	
et	 al.,	 2013;	Heinz	et	 al.,	 2018).	 In	many	 cases	psychotic	 illness	 is	 heralded	by	 the	
development	of	delusions	(often	delusional	interpretations	of	hallucinations)	after	a	
prodromal	 period	 of	 hallucinatory	 experiences	 without	 delusional	 interpretation	
and/or	delusional	mood.	 In	the	context	of	weak	low	level	(sensory)	priors	and	high	
precision	 of	 sensory	 prediction	 errors,	 delusions	 may	 emerge	 as	 result	 of	
compensatory	 increases	 in	 the	 precision	 of	 high-level	 beliefs	 (i.e.	 enhanced	 high	
level,	 cognitive	 priors)	 (Adams	 et	 al	 2013,	 Sterzer	 et	 al	 2018,	 Heinz	 et	 al	 2018).	 It	
follows	then	that	in	the	very	early	phases	of	psychosis,	prior	to	the	development	of	
delusions,	such	compensatory	increases	in	the	precision	of	high	level	beliefs	may	be	
yet	 to	 emerge.	 Although	one	 previous	 study	 found	 alterations	 in	 the	 utilisation	 of	









that	 two	 important	 aspects	 of	 the	 predictive	 coding	 account	 have	 been	 largely	
neglected	in	empirical	clinical	studies:	the	contribution	of	different	disease	stages	to	
the	effect	of	prior	expectations,	and	the	type	of	prior	expectation.	It	is	the	aim	of	the	





depending	 on	 the	 stage	 of	 psychosis,	 we	 designed	 two	 novel	 auditory	 perception	
paradigms,	 one	 testing	 the	 influence	 of	 lip-movements	 on	 auditory	 perception	
(perceptual	priors)	and	a	second	testing	the	influence	of	learned	written-word-sound	
associations	 on	 auditory	 perception	 (cognitive	 priors);	 and	 we	 gathered	 data	 on	
these	two	paradigms	in	two	patient	groups	–	individuals	at	elevated	clinical	risk	for	




developing	 a	 psychotic	 illness	 in	 the	 short	 to	 medium	 term	 (Yung	 et	 al.,	 2003).	
Studying	 these	 early	 stages	 of	 illness	may	 help	 us	 to	 understand	 the	mechanisms	
underlying	 the	 emergence	of	 a	 psychosis	 by	 examining	which	 aberrancies	 precede	
psychosis	and	might	therefore	be	predictive	of	developing	psychosis.		
	
The	 first	paradigm	(from	now	on	 ‘perceptual	priors	 task’)	assesses	 the	 influence	of	
lip-movements	 on	 auditory	 perception.	 Lip-movements	 have	 been	 shown	 to	












(2009)	 also	 studied	 the	 McGurk	 illusion	 in	 schizophrenia,	 finding	 mixed	 results:	
adolescents	 with	 schizophrenia,	 but	 not	 adults	 with	 schizophrenia,	 showed	 a	
diminished	 illusory	 effect.	 Schizophrenia	 has	 been	 associated	 with	 a	 diminished	






purpose	 of	 the	 perceptual	 priors	 task	 was	 to	 measure	 precisely	 how	 much	 lip-
movements	 influence	 what	 participants	 hear	 by	 using	 a	 staircase	 procedure	





learned	 written-word-sound	 associations	 on	 auditory	 perception.	 The	 impact	 of	
learned	associations	on	auditory	perception	has	been	shown	in	sensory	conditioning,	
where	 one	 stimulus	 functions	 as	 a	 predictor	 for	 an	 auditory	 stimulus	 that	 is	
otherwise	difficult	to	detect.	In	these	early	experiments,	participants	were	asked	to	









in	 schizophrenia	discussed	above.	However,	up	 to	date,	no	 study	has	explored	 the	
influence	 of	 learned	 cognitive	 expectations	 in	 individuals	 at-risk	 for	 psychosis	 and	
compared	it	to	the	influence	of	sensory	expectations	on	perception.	
	
We	 recognize	 that	 the	 sensory	 and	 cognitive	 priors	 tasks	 are	 strictly	 speaking	 not	
able	 to	 estimate	 the	 relative	 precision	 and	 mean	 of	 the	 prior	 expectations	 and	
sensory	 evidence	 for	 each	 participant	 directly.	 Instead	 we	 make	 the	 assumption	
based	on	Bayesian	theories	of	the	brain	that	perception	is	a	function	of	the	precision	
and	mean	of	 the	prior	and	sensory	evidence.	Therefore	rather	 then	estimating	the	
precision	 and	 mean	 for	 the	 prior	 and	 sensory	 evidence	 separately,	 we	 infer	 the	
relative	contribution	of	prior	information	and	sensory	evidence,	and	term	this	for	the	








alterations	 in	 the	 contribution	 of	 prior	 expectations	 in	 perception.	 Changes	 in	
glutamate	 levels	 have	 been	 associated	 with	 schizophrenia	 (Marsman	 et	 al.,	 2011;	
Merritt	et	al.,	2016;	Treen	et	al.,	2016),	including	in	the	cingulate	cortex,	where	there	
is	 evidence	 of	 excessive	 glutamate	 in	 early	 illness	 stages,	 possibly	 progressing	 to	
reductions	in	later	stages	(Merritt	et	al	2016,	Kumar	et	al	2018).	It	remains	unclear	to	
what	 extent	 glutamate	 levels	 in	 the	 brain	 relate	 to	 predictive	 coding	mechanisms	
putatively	 mediating	 psychosis,	 in	 spite	 of	 various	 theoretical	 arguments	 and	
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extrapolations	from	preclinical	experiments	(Corlett	et	al.,	2011;	Sterzer	et	al	2018).	
Notably	 the	 anterior	 cingulate	 cortex	 (ACC)	 has	 been	 associated	 with	 processing	
uncertainty	 (Rushworth	 et	 al.,	 2008)	 and	 precision-weighting	 of	 information	 in	
health	 	and	psychosis	 (Cassidy	et	al.,	2017;	Katthagen,	et	al.,	2018;	Haarsma	et	al.,	
2019).	 Thus	 alterations	 in	 glutamate	 levels	 in	 the	ACC	might	 alter	 the	precision	of	
prior	information,	thereby	changing	the	degree	to	which	priors	influence	perception.	
We	 therefore	 explored	 this	 issue	 by	 measuring	 magnetic	 resonance	 spectroscopy	
(MRS)	 glutamate	 levels	 in	 the	 anterior	 cingulate	 cortex	 and	 relating	 these	







In	 summary,	 we	 use	 a	 cross-sectional	 design	 to	 study	 altered	 use	 of	 prior	
expectations	in	auditory	perception	in	individuals	at-risk	for	psychosis,	first	episode	
psychosis	 and	 controls.	We	 expect	 to	 find	 differences	 in	 the	 balance	 between	 the	
use	 of	 prior	 expectations	 and	 sensory	 input	 depending	 on	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 prior	
expectation	 (sensory	 vs.	 cognitive)	 and	 disease	 stage	 (at-risk	 vs.	 first	 episode	
psychosis).	 Specifically,	 we	 expect	 that	 at	 early	 stages	 of	 psychosis	 (clinical	 risk),	













at-risk	 mental	 state	 patients	 (ARMS,	 n=29,	 average	 21.5	 years,	 8	 female)	 were	
recruited	 from	 the	 Cambridge	 Early	 intervention	 service	 North	 and	 South.	 In	
addition,	 ARMS	 patients	 were	 recruited	 from	 a	 help-seeking,	 low-mood,	 high	




interview.	 All	 FEP	 participants	 had	 current	 delusions	 or	 previous	 delusions	 in	 the	
case	 of	 those	with	 partial	 or	 recent	 recovery.	 Healthy	 volunteers	 (Healthy	 control	
sample	HCS,	 n=32,	 average	 22.6	 years,	 15	 female)	without	 a	 history	 of	 psychiatric	
illness	or	brain	injury	were	recruited	as	control	subjects.	Healthy	volunteers	did	not	
report	 any	 personal	 or	 family	 history	 of	 neurological,	 psychiatric	 or	 medical	
disorders.	 All	 participants	 had	 normal	 hearing	 and	 normal	 or	 corrected	 to	 normal	
vision.	 All	 participants	 gave	 informed	 consent.	 The	 study	was	 part	 of	 the	NCAAPS	






We	 used	 the	 Cardiff	 Abnormal	 Perceptions	 scale	 (CAPS,	 Bell	 et	 al.,	 2006),	 Peters	
Delusion	Index	scale	(PDI,	Peters	et	al.,	1999),	Comprehensive	Assessment	for	the	At-
risk	Mental	State	 interview	 (CAARMS,	Yung	et	al.,	2003)	and	Positive	and	Negative	
Symptoms	 Scale	 (PANSS,	 Kay	 et	 al.,	 1989)	 to	 assess	 “caseness”,	 symptom	 severity	
and	frequency.	Both	the	total	scores	for	the	CAPS	and	PDI	and	the	subscales	of	the	
CAPS	and	PDI	are	 reported	 in	 table	1.	 For	 the	PDI	and	CAPS	 the	participants	were	
required	 to	 give	 a	 yes	 or	 a	 no	 answer	 to	 a	 particular	 question.	 In	 case	 of	 a	 yes	
answer,	3	subscales	were	filled	in	which	utilised	a	5-point	Likert	scale.	The	CAARMS	
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A	 subset	 of	 participants	 was	 scanned	 on	 a	 Siemens	 Prisma	 3T	 scanner	 at	 the	
cognition	 brain	 sciences	 unit	 in	 Cambridge.	 The	 spectroscopy	 scan	 was	 part	 of	 a	
larger	MRI	 protocol	which	 contained	 in	 addition	 2	 fMRI	 protocols	 and	 a	 structural	
scan	 totalling	 90	minutes.	 The	 structural	 scan	was	 used	 to	 plan	 the	MRS	 voxel.	 A	
15mm	isotropic	voxel	was	placed	carefully	in	the	anterior	cingulate	cortex.	A	PRESS	
sequence	was	used	to	assess	glutamate	levels,	with	a	TR	of	1880ms	and	TE	of	30ms.	
150	 water-suppressed	 acquisitions	 were	 collected	 in	 addition	 to	 16	 unsuppressed	




In	 the	 present	 study	 auditory	 stimuli	 were	 presented	 that	 contained	 varying	
proportions	 of	 the	 phoneme	 /Ba	 or	 /Da	 (Figure	 1).	 The	 balance	 between	 the	 two	
stimuli	 always	 adds	up	 to	one.	 The	 contribution	of	 the	 stimulus	 /Ba	 is	 denoted	 as		
ωBa,	which	stands	for	“the	weight	of	/Ba”.	The	proportion	of	ωDa	can	be	derived	from	












combination	 with	 an	 auditory	 stimulus	 consisting	 of	 a	 stimulus	 ωBa=	 .8	 or	 ωBa=	 .2.	
They	 were	 then	 asked	 to	 report	 which	 sound	 they	 believed	 was	 dominant,	 after	
which	 they	 received	 feedback	 (correct/incorrect).	 The	 training	 was	 completed	 as	




consisting	 of	 a	 mix	 between	 the	 sound	 /Ba	 and	 /Da	 (as	 described	 above),	 which	
simultaneously	occurred	with	a	visual	stimulus	consisting	of	a	black	and	white	male	
face.	The	face	would	pronounce	either	/Ba	or	/Da	(lip-movement	condition),	or	the	
face	 would	 remain	 still	 (the	 reference	 condition).	 All	 three	 conditions	 were	
presented	 in	 a	 pseudo-randomised	 order	 such	 that	 all	 three	 conditions	 were	
presented	 in	a	 random	order	before	one	of	 the	conditions	 is	presented	again.	The	
participants	were	 instructed	 to	keep	 looking	at	 the	 lips	of	 the	 face	 throughout	 the	
task,	but	asked	to	report	what	phoneme	was	dominant	 in	the	auditory	stimulus	by	













point	 to	 converge	on	a	 stimulus	which	 contains	 .5	of	 /Ba	 and	 .5	of	 /Da.	However,	
when	 lip-movements,	 for	 example	 pronouncing	 /Ba	 were	 presented	 to	 bias	
perception	 towards	 the	 prior	 expectation,	 we	 expected	 that	 the	 task	 converged	
upon	an	indifference	point	that	contained	less	auditory	/Ba,	and	more	auditory	/Da.	
In	other	words,	more	auditory	/Da	was	needed	to	overcome	the	influence	that	the	










For	 each	 of	 the	 three	 conditions	 (Reference,	 /Da	 and	 /Ba),	 the	 perceptual	
indifference	 point	 was	 assessed	 twice:	 Once	 where	 the	 auditory	 stimulus	 started	
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which	was	defined	as	having	made	6	 switches	 in	perceiving	one	 stimulus	over	 the	
other	(e.g.	previously	perceiving	/Ba	on	trial	t-1	and	perceiving	/Da	on	t0,	indicating	
the	balance	between	the	two	auditory	stimuli	is	close	to	the	participants	perceptual	
indifference	 point).	 Second,	 a	 condition	 was	 completed	 when	 the	 participant	
indicated	that	the	sound	/Ba	or	/Da	is	100%	dominant	in	the	auditory	stimulus	(e.g.	a	
participant	 perceived	 /Da,	 even	 though	 the	 stimulus	 is	 100%	 /Ba/	 which	 could	
happen	when	the	visual	priors	are	dominating	perception).	 In	 the	second	case	 this	
would	 technically	not	be	an	 indifference	point.	However,	 for	 the	 remainder	of	 this	
study	 we	 will	 refer	 to	 it	 as	 such	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 simplicity.	 The	 priors	 dominated	
perception	only	 in	a	 small	minority	of	 cases	 (see	 results).	A	condition	was	aborted	
when	30	trials	had	been	presented	avoiding	the	task	from	taking	too	long.	This	did	
not	change	the	way	the	effect	of	the	prior	was	calculated.	In	order	to	test	for	group	
and	 condition	 differences	 in	 the	 amount	 of	 trials	 needed	 to	 reach	 an	 indifference	














taking	 the	difference	between	 the	perceptual	 indifference	point	of	 the	visual	prior	
condition	and	the	reference	condition	(see	Figure	2	upper	panel:	A	and	B).	The	total	











predictive	 of	 the	 auditory	 stimuli.	 In	 the	 other	 25%	 of	 the	 trials,	 no	 sound	 was	
presented	 following	 the	 letters.	 Here	 the	 participants	 were	 asked	 to	 report	 what	







B:	 participants	 were	 required	 to	 indicate	 which	 phoneme	 they	 believed	 to	 be	 most	 likely	 presented.	 C:	 The	









prior	 expectations.	 However,	 this	 time	 the	 prior	 expectations	 came	 from	 learned	
written	word-sound	associations.	Again,	 the	main	 task	 consisted	of	3	 conditions,	 a	
cognitive	prior	BA	and	DA	condition,	and	a	reference	condition,	which	consisted	of	
the	 letter	 ‘?A’.	 Each	 trial	 started	with	 the	 presentation	 of	 the	 letters	 ‘BA’,	 ‘DA’	 or	
‘?A’.	 After	 seeing	 ‘BA’	 or	 ‘DA’,	 participants	 were	 asked	 which	 phoneme	 they	
expected	 to	 perceive,	 which	 they	 indicated	 using	 one	 of	 4	 buttons	 indicating	 the	
perceived	phoneme	and	certainty	like	in	the	perceptual	priors	task.	The	participants	
were	 only	 asked	 to	 indicate	 their	 prediction	 following	 seeing	 the	 letters	 ‘BA’	 and	
‘DA’,	 but	 not	 after	 seeing	 ‘?A’.	 By	 making	 a	 conscious	 prediction	 regarding	 the	
upcoming	 stimulus,	 the	 use	 of	 the	 cognitive	 prior	 could	 be	 validated.	 In	 the	
reference	condition,	no	reliable	prediction	could	be	generated	as	both	options	were	
equally	likely.	500ms	after	they	made	a	decision	or	the	reference	stimulus	had	been	




of	 the	 non-reported	 stimulus	 in	 a	 step-wise	 fashion.	 However,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	
perceptual	priors	 task,	each	condition	was	presented	once	 for	each	cognitive	prior	
BA	and	DA,	 instead	of	 twice.	Within	 the	cognitive	BA	prior	condition,	 the	staircase	
started	at	ωBa	=	.7	and	ωDa	=	.3,	meaning	the	auditory	stimulus	was	relatively	clearly	
a	 /Ba	 sound.	 The	 same	 is	 true	 for	 the	 cognitive	 DA	 prior	 condition,	 where	 the	
staircase	started	at	ωBa	=	 .3	ωDa	=	 .7,	meaning	 the	auditory	stimulus	was	 relatively	
clearly	 a	 /Da	 sound.	 This	matching	 of	 the	 auditory	 stimulus	 to	 the	 cognitive	 prior	
condition	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 staircase	 was	 done	 to	 reaffirm	 the	 association	
between	 the	prior	 and	 the	 sound,	otherwise	 the	association	between	 the	 cue	and	
sound	could	have	been	lost	immediately	in	the	beginning	of	the	staircase.	Note	that	
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a	 reference	 condition	 for	 BA,	 and	 a	 reference	 condition	 for	 DA.	 The	 order	 of	 the	
condition	per	 participants	was	 pseudorandomised.	 In	 each	 condition,	 a	 perceptual	
indifference	point	was	assessed.	
	
The	 perceptual	 indifference	 point	 for	 each	 condition	was	 quantified	 by	 taking	 the	
average	of	ωBa	at	the	last	two	switches.	We	also	briefly	rapport	the	results	for	taking	
the	 final	 four	 switches	 to	 demonstrate	 this	 does	 not	 influence	 the	 results	
substantially.	 In	 order	 to	 quantify	 the	 strength	 of	 each	 prior,	 these	 perceptual	





Participants	completed	two	tasks:	 the	perceptual	priors	 task	 first	and	the	cognitive	
priors	 task	 second.	 Each	 task	 was	 performed	 on	 a	MacBook	 Pro,	 Retina,	 13-Inch,	
Early	 2013,	 and	 each	 lasted	 on	 average	 about	 10	 minutes.	 Participants	 wore	
Sennheisser	Headphones	to	ensure	optimal	hearing.	Both	the	Ba	and	the	Da	stimuli	

















each	 condition,	 we	 were	 able	 to	 test	 the	 correlation	 between	 two	 separately	
obtained	 measurements,	 giving	 an	 indication	 of	 their	 reliability.	 We	 tested	 the	
reliability	of	two	separate	variables.	First,	we	tested	the	reliability	of	the	indifference	
points	in	the	condition	without	a	perceptual	prior,	which	should	give	an	indication	of	
the	 reliability	 of	 the	 staircase	 method.	 Second,	 we	 tested	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	
strength	 of	 the	 perceptual	 priors,	which	 give	 an	 indication	 of	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	
method	 to	 measure	 the	 influence	 of	 lip-movements	 on	 auditory	 perception.		
Furthermore	we	tested	whether	the	perceptual	and	cognitive	priors	were	correlated	
with	 each	 other.	 Due	 to	 non-normality	 of	 the	 cognitive	 priors	 task,	 a	 Spearman	
correlation	was	used	to	assess	this.	
One	 tailed	 paired	 T	 tests	 were	 used	 to	 test	 for	 a	main	 effect	 of	 whether	 the	 lip-
movements	 shifted	 the	 perceptual	 indifference	 points	 in	 the	 expected	 direction	
compared	 to	 the	 reference	 condition.	 This	 was	 done	 for	 both	 the	 sensory	 and	
cognitive	prior	tasks.		















		 HCS	 ARMS	 FEP	 p-value	
		 32	 29	 30	 	
PANSS	 13.1(4.6)	 26.7(12.1)	 31.6(12.3)	 <.001	
Positive	 6.5(2.3)	 13.6(5.7)	 18.0(6.9)	 <.001	
Negative	 6.6(2.4)	 13.1(7.5)	 13.6(7.7)	 <.001	
MFQ	 8.5(5.1)	 33.2(17.4)	 31.8(23.6)	 <.001	
CAPS		 32.9(1.4)	 44.1(7.0)	 43.6(9.7)	 <.001	
Distress	 1.6(3.0)	 29.8(20.9)	 32.1(33.9)	 <.001	
Intrusive	 2.2(3.7)	 34.9(22.8)	 38.5(37.4)	 <.001	
Frequency	 1.3(2.3)	 28.3(17.8)	 29.7(31.1)	 <.001	
PDI	total	 22.4(1.5)	 29.3(4.5)	 31.1(6.5)	 <.001	
Distress	 2.4(2.8)	 24.1(16.9)	 28.0(23.9)	 <.001	
Intrusive	 2.4(2.7)	 23.6(17.4)	 29.5(22.9)	 <.001	
Conviction	 3.6(4.0)	 24.9(15.9)	 31.0(25.3)	 <.001	
Age	 22.4(3.7)	 21.8(3.5)	 25.1(4.8)	 <.01	







across	 all	 conditions.	We	 found	no	 overall	 effect	 of	 group	on	 the	 trials	 needed	 to	
reach	 a	 perceptual	 indifference	 point	 (F{2,87}=.262,	 p=.77)	 (HCS:	 19.1,	 SE:	 0.5;	
ARMS:	 19.1,	 SE:0.6;	 FEP:	 18.6,	 SE:	 0.4).	 However,	 we	 did	 find	 an	 effect	 of	 prior	
condition	 (F{2,174}=17.1,	 p<.001):	 needing	 fewer	 trials	 in	 the	 visual	 reference	
condition	(17.3,	SE:	0.3)	than	in	the	visual	BA	(18.9	SE:	0.4)	and	visual	DA	condition	






perceptual	 priors	 task.	 As	 this	 is	 a	 novel	 task,	 we	 tested	 whether	 these	
simultaneously	assessed	 indifference	points	correlated	strongly,	as	 that	would	give	
us	 an	 indication	 of	 the	 reliability	 of	 the	 measurement.	 First,	 we	 correlated	 the	
indifference	points	in	the	condition	where	no	priors	were	presented	(the	reference	
condition).	Across	groups	the	correlation	was	r=.73.	Separately	it	was	r=.83	for	HCS,	
r=.76	 for	 ARMS	 and	 r=.55	 for	 FEP	 (all	 p<.01).	 The	 correlation	 between	 the	 two	
reference	 points	 was	 significantly	 higher	 in	 the	 HCS	 group	 compared	 to	 the	 FEP	
group	(Fisher	r-to-z	transformation:	p=	.033),	but	not	between	other	groups	all	p>	.2.	
Second,	 in	a	similar	fashion,	we	assessed	how	strongly	the	effect	of	the	perceptual	
priors	 was	 correlated	 across	 the	 two	 simultaneously	 assessed	 staircases.	 The	
reliability	 of	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 perceptual	 priors	 across	 groups	 was	 r=.78.	
Separately,	it	was	r=.88	for	HCS,	r=.79	for	ARMS	and	.69	for	FEP	(all	p<.01)	(Figure	5).	
The	 differences	 in	 correlations	 between	 perceptual	 priors	 were	 not	 significantly	
different	 p>.2.	 For	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	 analyses	 we	 averaged	 for	 each	 visual	






indifference	 point	 in	 the	 reference	 condition.	 B:	 reliability	 of	 the	 strength	 of	 perceptual	 priors.	 C:	 Correlation	
between	 the	effect	of	 cognitive	Ba	stimulus	and	 the	cognitive	Da	stimulus.	D:	 correlation	between	sensory	and	
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Sensory and cognitive priors in HCS
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Figure	 6:	 Main	 effects	 of	 the	 sensory	 and	 cognitive	 priors	 are	 presented	 here.	 A:	 relative	 shift	 in	 perceptual	
indifference	points	under	different	sensory	prior	conditions	(lip	movements	pronouncing	/Ba	or	/Da)	compared	to	
reference	 condition	 (still	 lips).	 B:	 relative	 shift	 in	 perceptual	 indifference	 points	 under	 different	 cognitive	 prior	










indifference	point	by	 .21	 (95%	ci:	 .18-.23,	T{89}=14.0,	p<.0001).	 In	contrast,	Da	 lip-
movements	 increased	 the	 value	 of	ωBa	 in	 the	 perceptual	 indifference	 point	 by	 .16	
(95%	 ci:	 .14-.18,	 T{89}=13.2,	 p<.0001)	 on	 average.	 When	 comparing	 the	 relative	












































 Bias Ba vs Da for Cognitive priors
 Relative strength of sensory and cognitive priors




















































Analysing	 group	 differences,	 the	 perceptual	 indifference	 point	 in	 the	 reference	
condition	was	a	variable	of	no	interest,	as	it	merely	reflects	a	personal	preference	for	
either	the	auditory	/Ba	or	/Da	stimulus.	Indeed,	the	average	perceptual	indifference	
point	 in	 the	 reference	 condition	 across	 groups	 in	 reference	 groups	 was	 equal	





conducted	 a	 one-way	 ANOVA.	We	 indeed	 found	 evidence	 for	 a	 difference	 across	
groups	 (F{2,88}	 =	 5.32,	 p=.007,	 effect	 size	 η2=.11;	 Figure	 7A,	 7C).	 Bonferroni	
corrected	 post-hoc	 T-tests	 revealed	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 ARMS	
(MARMS=.28	 SEARMS=.03)	 and	 FEP	 (MFEP=.44	 SEFEP=.04)	 (p=.005,	 effect	 size	 d=.89,	 ci=	
.46-1.32),	but	not	between	healthy	controls	(MHCS=.37	SEHCS=.04)	and	ARMS	(p=.20,	
effect	 size	 d=	 -.51,	 ci=.01-1.01)	 or	 FEP	 (p=.44,	 effect	 size	 d=.34,	 ci=-.13-.85).	 We	
tested	whether	 changing	 the	 amount	of	 switch	points	 that	were	used	 to	 calculate	
the	indifference	point	changed	the	results.	When	we	change	this	from	two	to	four,	


























































We	 furthermore	analysed	 the	perceptual	prior	data	 in	a	Bayesian	 fashion.	 For	 this	
section	we	use	Jeffreys’s	(1961)	suggested	evidence	categories	for	the	Bayes	factor.	
We	 found	 that	 an	ANOVA	 revealed	moderate	evidence	 in	 support	 for	 a	difference	
across	groups	 (BF=6.3).	 Independent-sample	t-tests	 revealed	anecdotal	evidence	 in	
favour	of	a	difference	between	ARMS	and	healthy	controls	 (BF=1.4),	but	anecdotal	

















the	number	of	 trials	 needed	 (F{2,88}=3.34,	p=.040).	 The	HCS	 group	and	 the	ARMS	







group	 on	 the	 trials	 needed	 to	 reach	 a	 perceptual	 indifference	 point	 (F{2,88}=.44,	
p=.64)	(HCS:	18.5,	SE:	0.6;	ARMS:	18.9,	SE:0.6;	FEP:	18.1,	SE:	0.6).	However,	we	did	
find	an	effect	of	prior	 condition	 (F{2,88}=3.56,	p=.033).	Needing	 significantly	 fewer	
trials	 in	 the	 DA	 condition	 (17.6,	 SE:	 0.5)	 then	 in	 the	 visual	 BA	 (19.5	 SE:	 0.5)	 (T	
{180}=2.63,	 p=.	 018)	 but	 not	 the	 reference	 condition	 (18.3,	 SE:	 0.5)	 (T{180}=1.08,	




1.3.2.3. Cognitive	 priors	 shifted	 the	 perceptual	 indifference	 points	 in	 the	
expected	direction	
In	order	 to	assess	 the	main	effect	of	 cognitive	priors,	each	perceptual	 indifference	
point	of	 the	 two	 cognitive	prior	 conditions	was	 subtracted	 from	 its	own	 reference	
condition.	We	 found	 that	 the	 cognitive	 BA	 prior	 lowered	 the	 value	 of	ωBa	by	 .042	
(zval	=	-5.2,	p<	.0001),	and	for	the	cognitive	DA	prior	the	value	of	ωBa	was	increased	
by	 .027	 (zval	 =	 3.7,	p=	 .0002).	 	 This	 shows	 that	 there	was	 indeed	a	main	effect	 of	
cognitive	priors	on	perceptual	 indifference	points.	 The	 relationship	between	effect	
of	BA	and	DA	priors	 is	 shown	 in	Figure	5C.	 For	 the	 remainder	of	 the	analyses,	 the	
	 26	






We	 used	 a	 non-parametric	 ANOVA	 that	 is	 robust	 against	 Type	 I	 errors	 in	 non-
normally	 distributed	 data.	 The	 differences	 between	 the	 average	 strength	 of	 the	
cognitive	 priors	 was	 significant	 (Independent-Samples	 Kruskal-Wallis	 Test:	 p=.023,	
effect	 size	η2=.11).	Using	a	post-hoc	Bonferroni	 corrected	Wilcoxon	 rank	 sum	 test,	
we	found	stronger	usage	of	cognitive	priors	in	the	FEP	group	compared	to	both	the	
HCS	group	(zval:	2.35,	ranksum:	840,	p=.037,	effect	size	d=.64,	ci=.11-1.17),	and	the	
ARMS	 group	 (zval:2.35,	 ranksum:	 714,	 p=.037,	 effect	 size	 d=.62,	 ci=.10-1.14),	 but	
between	the	HCS	group	and	the	ARMS	group	p>.5.	We	tested	whether	changing	the	
amount	of	switch	points	that	were	used	to	calculate	the	indifference	point	changed	
the	 results.	 When	 we	 change	 this	 from	 two	 to	 four,	 we	 find	 the	 same	 (slightly	
stronger)	effect:	FEP	vs	HCS:	p=.015,	FEP	vs	ARMS:	p=.016,	HCS	vs	ARMS:	p>.5).	
We	also	analysed	the	cognitive	prior	data	 in	a	Bayesian	fashion,	and	found	that	an	
ANOVA	 revealed	 moderate	 evidence	 in	 support	 for	 a	 difference	 across	 groups	
(BF=7.5).	 Independent-sample	 t-tests	 revealed	moderate	 evidence	 in	 favour	 of	 no	
difference	between	ARMS	and	healthy	controls	(BF=3.5),	but	moderate	evidence	in	
favour	 of	 a	 difference	 between	 healthy	 controls	 and	 FEP	 (BF=3.5).	 There	was	 also	
anecdotal	evidence	for	a	difference	between	ARMS	and	FEP	(BF=2.8)	(Figure	7B,	7D).	
Although	 we	 had	 no	 evidence	 that	 the	 extreme	 values	 represent	 measurement	
error,	 we	 analysed	 the	 results	 having	 excluded	 outliers	 in	 all	 three	 experimental	
groups	(1	HCS,	1	ARMS,	3	FEP).	We	found	similar	results	(two	sample	t-test	adjusted	
for	multiple	comparisons:	averaging	over	 final	2	switch	points:	HCS	vs	FEP:	p=.035,	













This	 was	 indeed	 the	 case,	 showing	 a	 stronger	 effect	 of	 perceptual	 priors	 (.37)	
compared	 to	 the	 cognitive	 priors	 across	 all	 groups	 (.07)	 (T{90}=-14.34,	 p<.0001,	
effect	size	d=1.5,	ci=	1.8-1.2)	(Figures	5D,	6C).	Subsequently,	we	tested	whether	the	
strength	 of	 cognitive	 and	 perceptual	 priors	 was	 correlated	 using	 a	 Spearman	
correlation.	 This	 was	 indeed	 the	 case	 (Rho=.24,	 p<.02).	 When	 exploring	 the	
correlations	separate	for	each	group,	we	found	a	negative	(trend-level)	correlation	in	
the	 ARMS	 group	 (Rho=-.33,	 p=.08),	 and	 positive	 correlations	 in	 the	 HCS	 (Rho=.52,	
p=.002)	 and	 (trend-level)	 in	 the	 FEP	 group	 (Rho=.30,	 p=.10).	 Using	 a	 Fisher	 r-to-z	
transformation	 We	 found	 that	 the	 relationship	 was	 significantly	 different	 for	 the	
ARMS	group	compared	to	the	healthy	control	group	(Z=-3.28,	p=.001),	and	FEP	group	
(Z=-2.25,	 p=.024).	 The	 correlation	 between	 healthy	 controls	 and	 FEP	 was	 not	
significantly	 different	 (Z=1.0,	 p=.31).	 As	 these	 findings	 constituted	 secondary	
analyses,	 they	 are	 not	 properly	 controlled	 for	 multiple	 comparisons.	 When	
controlling	 for	 multiple	 tests,	 only	 the	 relationship	 in	 the	 healthy	 control	 group	
remains	significant.		
	
1.3.4. Glutamate	 levels	 correlate	 with	 cognitive	 priors	 in	 HCS	 and	 perceptual	
priors	in	FEP	
Correlations	 with	 glutamate	 were	 tested	 in	 a	 subset	 of	 participants,	 namely	 18	
healthy	controls,	19	ARMS,	and	14	FEP	patients.	We	looked	for	a	correlation	across	
all	 participants	 between	 glutamate	 levels	 and	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 perceptual	 and	
cognitive	 priors,	 but	 found	 no	 significant	 correlation	 (perceptual:	 Rho=.18,	 p=.21,	
cognitive:		Rho=.17,	p=.23).	When	exploring	the	correlations	in	the	separate	patient	
groups,	we	found	that	there	is	a	significant	positive	relationship	between	glutamate	
levels	 and	 cognitive	 priors	 in	 the	 control	 group	 (Rho=.53,	 p=.023),	 but	 not	 with	
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perceptual	 priors	 (Rho=.294,	 p=.24).	 In	 the	ARMS	group	no	 significant	 correlations	
were	found	for	either	cognitive	(Rho=.0,	p=1)		or	perceptual	priors	(Rho=.07,	p=.78).	
In	 the	 FEP	 group	 a	 significant	 correlation	 was	 found	 with	 perceptual	 (Rho=.57,	
p=.035)	but	not	cognitive	priors	(Rho=.43,	p=.128).	As	these	findings	were	secondary	
to	the	core	hypothesis	in	the	present	chapter,	they	were	not	corrected	for	multiple	
comparisons.	 The	 effects	 do	 not	 remain	 significant	 when	 they	 are	 controlled	 for	
multiple	comparisons	(See	Figures	8	and	9).	
